Fortinet's CVEs Arrive: What the 10 November Advisories Say About the October Patches

On 24 October I wrote about Fortinet’s hardening release and said the advisories would follow on Patch Tuesday. They landed on 10 November. I have read the highest-severity ones on Fortinet’s PSIRT pages, and they change one line in the table I published.

This is not a complete list of the batch. The PSIRT listing runs to many more advisories than I read, and I have only covered the ones below. Each row is checked against its own advisory page, as read on 13 November, not a news summary.

The advisories I read

AdvisoryCVECVSSAffectsIssueFixed in
FG-IR-26-219CVE-2026-1261709.8FortiManager, FortiAnalyzer 8.0.0 to 8.0.2 and 7.6.0 to 7.6.7 (7.4 and 7.2 not affected)Improper output escaping in the JSON-RPC API, only when the JSON API is enabled7.6.8. For 8.0 the fix is “upcoming 8.0.3”
FG-IR-26-268CVE-2026-1262549.6FortiOS, FortiSASENumeric truncation in the BGP daemon, from a configured iBGP neighbourFortiOS 8.0.2, 7.6.8, 7.4.13, 7.2.14
FG-IR-26-267CVE-2026-1262539.3FortiOS, FortiSASEAuthentication bypass in the OSPF daemon, adjacent network, no privilegesFortiOS 8.0.2, 7.6.8, 7.4.13, 7.2.14
FG-IR-26-276CVE-2026-1262629.3FortiManager, FortiAnalyzerSQL injection reachable on the OFTP port, unauthenticatedFortiManager 8.0.1, FortiAnalyzer 8.0.2, 7.6.8, 7.4.12, 7.2.13
FG-IR-26-244CVE-2026-1262299.1FortiManager, FortiAnalyzerAuthorization bypass in dmserver, lets an authenticated administrator reach other VDOMs8.0.2, 7.6.8, 7.4.12, 7.2.13. For 7.0, migrate
FG-IR-26-275CVE-2026-1262619.0FortiManagerFGFM privilege elevation before the registration password is verified, unauthenticated8.0.1, 7.6.8, 7.4.6, 7.2.9
FG-IR-26-274CVE-2026-1262609.0FortiManager, FortiAnalyzerPre-auth SSRF reachable on the OFTP port8.0.1, 7.6.8, 7.4.12. 7.2 not affected
FG-IR-26-269CVE-2026-1262557.4FortiOS, FortiSASE, FortiProxy, FortiPAMAuthentication bypass in the SSH daemon, unauthenticatedFortiOS 8.0.2, 7.6.8, 7.4.13, 7.2.14
not notedCVE-2026-1262528.3FortiAuthenticatorAuthenticated SQL injection in the API8.0.4, 6.6.11

Every advisory I read lists “Known Exploited: No” and “Virtual Patch: No”. Only FG-IR-26-219 gives a workaround, covered below. The acknowledgement lines on several of them say the bugs were found internally by Fortinet’s Product Security team, with a frontier AI model (Claude Mythos) named alongside the researchers.

What the October table got right

For FortiOS, the October builds cover everything in that table. 7.6.8, 8.0.2, 7.4.13 and 7.2.14 are the fixed releases for the OSPF, BGP and SSH daemon items, so the advice to patch before the details arrived turned out sound for the FortiOS estate.

For FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer, the October builds also hold up. 7.6.8 is a fixed release for every item above, and so are 7.4.12 and 7.2.13 for the ones that affect those trains. The FGFM item looked like the one that might break that, but its advisory lists fixes as far back as 7.4.6 and 7.2.9, so the October builds clear it.

Where it needs a footnote

My table listed 8.0.2 as the fixed FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer build. That holds for everything except one item. CVE-2026-126170, the 9.8, affects 8.0.0 through 8.0.2, and Fortinet lists the 8.0 fix as an upcoming 8.0.3. If you are on 8.0.2 because I wrote that it was fixed, you are not done for that one. The same advisory lists FortiAnalyzer-BigData 7.6.0 to 7.6.2 as waiting for an upcoming 7.6.3.

One smaller point: for CVE-2026-126229, FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer 7.0 are affected in all versions and Fortinet’s answer is to migrate to a fixed release. My table did not cover 7.0.

So read the version list per CVE, not per release. The 8.0 train is where that matters.

The one workaround

The JSON API in FG-IR-26-219 is disabled by default, and the advisory says the system is only exposed when it is enabled on an admin profile. Fortinet’s workaround is to set rpc-permit to none on the profile. First list what is set:

show system admin profile

Look for rpc-permit on each profile. This is the form the advisory gives, with a default profile name as the example. Repeat it for every profile that has it enabled:

config system admin profile
    edit "Standard_User"
        set rpc-permit none
    next
end

Check that nothing you run depends on the JSON API before you turn it off. Automation against FortiManager is the usual dependency.

The three-week gap

watchTowr’s worry in October was that three weeks between patch and advisory gives attackers time to compare the patched and unpatched builds. In the 24 October post I wrote the opposite: that a long wait leaves an attacker less to diff against. That sentence is the weaker of the two arguments. The patches were public from 22 October, and a diff needs the patched code, not the advisory.

What the advisories show is what was behind that window. Several of the critical items sit on ports and services a management plane should never expose to the internet: the OFTP port, the FGFM port, the JSON API. A pre-auth SQL injection and a pre-auth SSRF on OFTP, and a pre-auth FGFM elevation, are the kind of thing someone could have gone looking for in the diff. As of these pages nothing is listed as exploited, and I did not find reports of exploitation in the coverage I read. I would still treat the window as one where that was possible, and check CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue yourself rather than relying on my snapshot.

If your FortiManager or FortiAnalyzer answers on any of those ports from an untrusted network, fixing that is a bigger risk reduction than the exact version you land on. The Peerstitch post covers what a compromised one leaves behind, and the FGFM trust model post covers why FGFM deserves the attention.

Two cautions on the advisory pages

The pages are still moving. FG-IR-26-268 gained an “Updated Date” of 13 November when Fortinet added IPS package information, three days after publication. Reread the page you rely on before you act on it.

Some fields also do not agree with their own summaries. FG-IR-26-219 and FG-IR-26-268 list “Denial of service” as the impact while their summaries describe code execution or a malformed-attribute attack on connected routers. I have followed the summaries and the version tables. Where a news write-up and the advisory page disagree on a fixed version, the PSIRT page is the primary source.

What I would do now

  1. Confirm what you run: FortiManager and FortiAnalyzer versions first, then FortiOS.
  2. On FortiManager or FortiAnalyzer 8.0.x, check rpc-permit on every admin profile and disable it where nothing needs it, until 8.0.3 ships.
  3. On 7.4 and 7.2, the October builds (7.4.12 and 7.2.13) cover the items above. On 7.0, plan a migration for the dmserver item.
  4. Take FortiManager, FortiAnalyzer and anything else with OFTP, FGFM or the JSON API off untrusted networks.
  5. Set a reminder for 8.0.3, which is listed as forthcoming, and recheck these pages when it lands.

Sources: